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Abstract
The adoption of mandatory gender quotas in party lists has been a subject of
discussion in many countries. Since any reform obviously requires the approval
of a (sometimes qualified) majority of incumbent legislators’ votes, keeping an
eye on incumbents’ interests and incentives in diﬀerent systems seems a natural
thing to do if we want to understand diﬀerent prospects for reforms in diﬀerent
countries. Such diﬀerences in the cost-benefit analysis of incumbents may well
depend on the electoral system. We argue that if male candidates have a higher
probability of being elected when running against a female candidate than when
running against a male of similar characteristics (male advantage), then single
member district majority rule and closed list proportional representation are
opposite extremes in terms of incentives for incumbents to pass parity laws. We
validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as
well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in France, since France
oﬀers a natural experiment for both electoral systems. Given the male advan-
tage, increasing the number of female new candidates made the incumbents’
probability of reelection higher and thus male incumbent members of the As-
sembly have actually benefited from the parity law. We also show that parity




In June 2000, the French National Assembly, in spite of the opposition of the Senate,
passed a law — the so called “parity law” — that requires parties to choose roughly
equal numbers of men and women as candidates in their lists. Such a parity law
is the only case of strong gender quotas for chambers using single member district
elections.1 However, the law also prescribes that parties failing to present an equal
number of men and women on their lists will not be eliminated from the competition
but will pay per-violation fines.
In the first legislative elections that followed, in 2002, the fraction of female can-
didates elected for the Assembly surprisingly stayed almost constant (12.3 % instead
of 10.9 %), well below that in countries where quotas are voluntarily introduced by
parties2 or where legal quotas are lower.3 , 4 What can motivate the members of a
male dominated Parliament to make such a strong kind of gender representation
reform? Why were deputies almost unanimously in favor of the reform while the
senators were mostly opposed? Why was the law so unsuccessful at achieving its
purported aim of gender equity at the Assembly level (whereas it was much more
successful, for instance, at the municipal level)? This paper aims to provide a con-
sistent set of answers to these questions, by means of a simple formal model of
constitutional reform incentives as well as empirical analysis.
Our explanation relates to the special incentives created by the French Assem-
bly electoral system, the Single Member District system, when deputies expect the
voters to be biased on average in favor of male candidates. Assuming that male
candidates perform better when running against female candidates, we prove that
1The French Assembly is formed using single-member-district majority rule. The Senate is
elected using plurality rule in small districts and closed-list proportional representation in large
ones. The two chambers are called by the Constitution to vote together on constitutional reforms
like the one discussed here. Since the Assembly is much larger than the Senate, explaining the
almost unanimous support of the reform in the Assembly is suﬃcient to understand the approval of
the reform. The parity law takes diﬀerent forms in the diﬀerent types of elections, and in the case
of the Assembly it means that each party should have between 48% and 52% of candidates of each
gender across districts. For closed list elections, the parity law requires the parties to alternate men
and women in the lists.
2Norwegian parties were the first ones to introduce such quotas, which are now widespread in
Northern Europe and elsewhere.
3Lower legal quotas have been introduced for example in Argentina, Costa Rica and Belgium.
4A summary of the legislations and eﬀects of gender quotas across countries and electoral systems
can be found in table 1 of Jones [11].
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parity in an SMD electoral system favours the male incumbents by increasing their
probability of running against a woman. Given the importance of the male advan-
tage assumption for the main theoretical point of the paper, our complementary
empirical analysis will be devoted to carefully establish the existence of a male
advantage in the data from all the most recent French elections.5
By proving that the self interest of a majority can suﬃce to explain the introduc-
tion of laws that prima facie protect or foster minority interests,6 and by insisting on
the role of the electoral system in creating such incentives, we introduce a new look
at demand and supply side explanations of aﬃrmative action policies. This paper
also opens a new door in the analysis of the relationship between electoral systems
and women representation. It has of course long been observed that electoral rules
have a huge impact on the fraction of women elected (see Duverger [9]). There is
a long literature on this topic, trying in particular to explain why the fraction of
female legislators is larger and increases more rapidly under Proportional Represen-
tation than under SMD (see, e. g., Matland and Studlar [15], Rosenthal [19], Siaroﬀ
[20]). A common feature of that literature is that the electoral rules are viewed as
exogenous variables. That is, the possibility that identical factors determine both
the electoral rules and the representation of women (or the eﬀectiveness of some af-
firmative action policies) is ignored. Our contribution precisely consists of showing
that electoral rules (in our case, the parity law) and the resulting low number of
women elected are both explained by the same factors.
Our main empirical result, i.e., the evidence that there existed a significant male
bias among voters during the legislative elections after the introduction of parity, is
fully documented in section 2. In section 3, we present the model with which we
prove that a male bias among voters gives male incumbents the incentive, under
an SMD electoral system, to pass a parity law. In section 4, we concentrate on
the opposition to the law by Senators, linking it again to the electoral system.
The Senate, indeed, uses a PR system (in suﬃciently large districts) and parity
requires placing women in alternating positions on the party list. While such a
5To be precise, the “male advantage” empirical finding shown in Section 2 is that, controlling
for observables, when a new (or incumbent) male candidate runs against a woman, he does better
than male and female new (or incumbent) candidates running against an opponent of the same sex.
Similarly, females running against males do worse than females running against females.
6Our theoretical and empirical analysis relate to the incumbents’ interests vis a vis legal can-
didacy quotas. The analysis of the incentives of party members to pass voluntary quotas at the
individual party level is beyond the scope of this paper.
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system should eventually achieve gender equality (hence the opposition of male
incumbent senators), we will show how the voters’ very low willingness to punish
parties circumventing the law was strategically exploited by male incumbent senators
to maintain their seat. In section 5, we will oﬀer some concluding comments.
In the remainder of the introduction, we would like (1) to present in greater detail
our theory and its empirical foundations, (2) to argue why alternative explanations
find less support in the data, and finally, (3) to discuss the possible reconciliation
between this paper and the existing literature.
Let us first give more details about the theory. Our formal model suggests
that passing parity with the provision of possible fees dominates all other options
(namely the status quo and pure parity without violations allowed) if the re-election
of incumbents matters more to party leaders than the election of new candidates.
The argument goes as follows: Given the voters’ bias in favor of men candidates,
parties are in favor of a gender quota because it increases the incumbents’ probability
(conditional on running) of running against a woman and being re-elected. On the
other hand, pure parity (with no violations allowed) decreases the probability for the
male incumbents of a large party to run again. Therefore, fees are rationalizable as
they constitute a direct way to make more incumbents run than the strict application
of parity would allow. The ex-ante drawback of parity with fees is that if one party
pays fees, this obviously decreases the other party’s incumbents’ chances of running
against a woman. Therefore, it is not always true that parity with fees ex-ante
dominates both strict parity and no-parity. We prove in Section 3 that there exist
values of the fees and the preference by party leaders for incumbents over new
candidates that guarantee that, in equilibrium, parties are willing to pay fees only
in order to allow incumbents to run. Parity with fees, then, has the two attractive
properties (for the incumbents) that (1) it increases the probability for incumbents
to run against women, and (2) it does not prevent incumbents from large parties to
run. Finally, the presence of male advantage and the access to (costly) violations of
the quota also explain why the percentage of women elected did not increase very
much in the two Assembly elections that occurred after the introduction of parity.
Coming to the relationship between our account of parity and alternative poten-
tial explanations, our first caveat is that we do not claim to have a complete story
for the adoption of the law. For instance, we completely disregard the surely essen-
tial role of feminist movements.7 French feminists and other progressive movements
7Greater feminist activism has been shown to aﬀect women representation (see, e.g., Caul [1]).
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in the years before the parity law were certainly a factor forcing the members of
Parliament to take the issue seriously, and such a pressure may well belong to the
list of explanatory variables for the timing of the reform.8 However, a theory only
based on lobbying and social movements does not explain why the French deputies
supported almost unanimously a parity law at a time in which the French Sena-
tors almost unanimously objected against it and no other European Parliament was
ready to approve even lower quotas, in the presence of similar pressures by similar
movements.
The most common explanation of the French passing of the law followed by its
low success (explanation defended by the oﬃcial “Observatoire de la parité entre les
femmes et les hommes” in their report to the Prime Minister following the elections,
see Zimmerman [22]) is the following one: deputies passed a parity law because
the French people wanted it, that is, parity was a symbolic gesture associated to a
demand of parity from the electorate, but it was rather ineﬀective because of the
power of incumbents to force the party to circumvent the law (by paying fees) and
be able to run. There are three logical diﬃculties or shortcomings associated to this
explanation. First, if deputies passed the law to meet the will of the people, why
were the Senators so forcefully against it? We describe at length, in Section 4, how
the Senators tried to amend the law and how the electoral system changed in the
subsequent years to decrease its impact. We also explain why the impact of parity
has been so limited in spite of the theoretically favourable electoral system. We view
that as a clear proof that Senators tried to defend their seats, which the parity law
threatened given the PR system. Consequently, the reason why the symbolic gesture
only came from deputies must be related to the lower threat on their incumbency.
Second, the law was not voted by parties but by deputies themselves. The same
politicians (from both main parties) who passed the law and proudly claimed to
have brought French democracy to a new era, a few months later heavily lobbied
8Any attempt to explain the timing of the reform should take into account the pressure by the
parity movements as well as the particular incentive structure for incumbents identified here for
Assembly deputies. An example about how these two elements may have been complementary in
the explanation of the reform is the following: the parity movement had an impact also through
internal pressures within the socialist party, which was expecting to lose support; introducing parity
was perhaps viewed by the socialist party leaders as a way to introduce a topic that ceteris paribus
was expected to be in their favor and that would also temporarily raise incumbency advantage
to maintain their seat; the others voted for it because as incumbents they were not going to be
aﬀected for awhile, and going against would have been unpopular and would have made the issue
more salient.
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the party leaders to obtain the right to run again. Were they unable in 2000 to
anticipate that they would have huge incentives to circumvent the law in 2002?
On the contrary, we view this as a proof that they correctly anticipated that their
inconsistency would not be punished by voters. More precisely, it is quite likely, in
our opinion, that most politicians anticipated that they would benefit, at least in the
next elections, from a larger incumbent advantage due to the increased probability
of competing against a woman.
Third, if parity was demanded by voters, why didn’t they punish the parties that
did not comply with the parity requirement, or more precisely, how can we explain
the negative correlation between the fraction of female candidates and the success
of the party?9
The literature on women’s low representation in parliaments has concentrated
on two main sets of explanations: those based on the electoral rules, and those
based on the functioning of and/or the competition between parties. On the other
hand, it has almost disregarded explanations based on voters’ preferences. The
common wisdom in the literature is that voters’ antipathy towards female candidates
is not supported by the data (at least in Western democracies; see, e.g., Darcy
and Schramm [5], Rasmussen [18], Hunter and Denton [10], Kelley and McAllister
[13]).10 , 11 The French case makes us stand in contrast with this literature, given
our empirical finding of male advantage and given the explanatory power of our
constitutional design model based on such a finding. However, the contrast is less
sharp than it may seem at first glance, since there is a simple story that could at the
9The main right wing party (UMP), winner of the 2002 election, presented only 19.93% of women
and paid EUR 4M, representing 15.8% of its government funding, while the main left wing party
(a coalition led by the Socialist Party), second main group at the Assembly, presented 36.13% of
women and lost 9.1% of its funding (see Jourdain [12]). The third party, UDF, also presented less
than 50 % of women and paid fees, whereas all other parties complied with the parity requirement.
Note that in France campaign financing is very restricted, so that these reductions in party funds
have non trivial consequences.
10 In closed party list systems it is obviously impossible to directly test the existence of a male
bias among voters, since voters vote for parties, not candidates. Hence the only systems in which
voters’ bias can be empirically tested on field data against party bias are plurality systems or open
list systems. Survey data can be collected of course for both systems, but the reliability remains
intuitively higher for systems in which voters cast their ballot for individual candidates.
11By antipathy, hostility or preference towards male or female candidates, we clearly mean those
revealed by actual votes. We do not explore the reasons why voters would claim in interviews to
be willing to vote for this or that candidate. Evidences like the ones given by Converse and Pierce
[4], for instance, is hardly related to our undertaking.
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same time make sense of our theory and serve as reconciliation with the findings for
other countries in other studies: the parity law itself, by forcing parties to rapidly
increase the number of female candidates, may have brought about an asymmetry
in the perceived quality of male and female candidates. Our data analysis shows
that female new candidates at the 2002 elections were easier to defeat than male
new candidates. Given that France is the only country with such a parity law,
this evidence is the only one we need to support our model, and for the very same
reason, it does not contradict any of the previous studies necessarily. Moreover, we
also estimated the same bias with data from the 2007 elections (see table 3 below),
and the male bias looks smaller, in line with the above hypothesis that parity may
create just a short run advantage to male incumbents.
We need to add, however, that two other findings (documented below) question
the common wisdom about absence of voters’ gender bias beyond the eﬀect of parity
itself just mentioned. First, we estimated the possible male bias using the data from
the elections before the parity law was passed (see table 3), and, even if missing data
prevent us from giving the same credit to those estimations, we find a significant
male bias of similar magnitude. Second, we estimated the possible male bias using
2002 data about all male and female incumbents. We surprisingly find a significant,
though smaller, male bias. Clearly, this cannot be due to the injection in the system
of new and inexperienced female candidates. More work needs to be done in order
to conclude whether the male bias is induced by parity or associated to a persistent
feature of the French electorate.12 This puzzle is important per se and will be
decisive for the long run impact of parity on women representation.13
One may argue that the male bias we find does not reflect voters’ but parties’
hostility against women. We call this hypothesis “party bias”, and it is obviously
related to the “male conspiracy theory” proposed in Duverger [9]. By systematically
12We remark that by voters’ persistent bias we do not refer necessarily to discriminating prefer-
ences, but to whatever reasons may make voters have a net preference for men when all the other
observable variables are kept constant. For instance, a voters’ bias can arise from a wide-spread
belief that men bring more pork to the district, whereas women are more concerned about global
public goods, and the electorate of a district may prefer a focus on the former type of policies.
13The indications that the male bias may be persistent in the population, should not be considered
once again in contradiction to the literature: Our estimations focus on the Assembly elections,
where competition is head-to-head. That the willingness to vote for female candidates is lower in
this type of elections compared to elections where women are part of a larger ticket is, after all,
the implicit assumption of the literature on the relationship between electoral systems and women
representation and on the superiority of PR over SMD.
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sending female new candidates to less favourable districts than male candidates,
indeed, parties can create the type of bias we have found. After Lovenduski and
Norris [14], the literature on the low representation of women in Parliaments has
highlighted the responsibilities of parties, and in particular of their organizational
and ideological barriers (see e.g. Caul [1, 2]). A first challenge to that view comes
from the fact that all French parties supported the law (as far as the Assembly is
concerned, and Senators from all parties criticised it). Most important, the main
challenge comes from the data. Estimating the party bias is a diﬃcult task, as it
should be carefully distinguished from the strategic use of the (male) incumbents’
advantage.14 The tests we present in Section 2 show that new male candidates have
not been placed in 2002 in districts more favorable to their party than new female
candidates. Also, the latter have not received a lower financial support from the
parties than the former.
2 Male Advantage and Voters’ Bias
This empirical section is divided in two parts. Section 2.1 shows that in the last
three elections for the French National Assembly there has been a significant male
advantage among candidates of otherwise similar characteristics. Let us recall that
for the main point of the paper to hold, and for the theoretical model to be mean-
ingful, proving the existence of such a male advantage is all that matters.
However, in Section 2.2, we will provide some interesting side results about the
potential sources of the observed male advantage.
Our data is mainly based on information collected from the website of the French
National Assembly.15 The website provides, among other things, biographical in-
formation on candidates in 2002 elections, their party aﬃliation and incumbency
status, and the district-by-district first- and second-round results in both the 1997
and 2002 elections, together with abstention rate of each district. We have then col-
lected the same data from the 2007 Assembly elections, in order to verify whether
14Note that some authors (for instance Murray ([17])) consider as a form of party bias the fact
that party leaders are not willing to de-select incumbents to replace them with female candidates.
That is not the form of bias we are investigating as we condition our analysis on the incumbency
status of the candidates and we assume that parties, which are a collection of incumbents, favor
the re-election of incumbents (of any gender). Thus, if a party does not display any bias in favor
of new men against new women in the allocation of the districts where the party does not have an
incumbent, then such a party is not biased in our sense, even if it does not de-select any incumbent.
15http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections
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M vs M F vs F M vs F F vs M Total
New vs New 16 12 16 16 60
New vs 97 Loser 30 4 2 2 38
New vs Mover 14 0 4 4 22
New vs Incumbent 186 22 73 73 354
97 Loser vs Mover 8 2 1 1 12
97 Loser vs Incumbent 67 2 14 20 103
Mover vs Mover 2 0 0 0 2
Mover vs Incumbent 2 0 1 1 4
Total 325 42 111 117 595
Table 1: Types of run-oﬀs
the findings from the 2002 data are robust or if there are significant changes.16 We
have also obtained age data from http://www.fluctuat.net/. Finally, some of the
data was given to us by the Centre de Données Socio-Politiques.
In order to avoid diﬃculties associated with variable number of parties and the
resulting strategic voting behavior, we focus on those districts where election went
to the second-round and where the two second-round candidates were from the two
main party coalitions of the 2002 elections, PS and UMP.17 Table 1 gives some
descriptive statistics for 2002 in terms of the frequency of the various “types” of
run-oﬀs.18
2.1 Male advantage
The goal here is to establish the presence of male advantage in the 2002 elections.
We will then see that some degree of male advantage remains also in 2007, but to a
lower extent.
For observation/candidate j, we assume a linear model of the form yj = βXj +
εj . Diﬀerent specifications are estimated, but in the basic one yj is candidate j’s
percentage of votes (henceforth score) in the second round of the 2002 (resp. 2007)
16We have complemented this with party contributions data for each candidate’s campaign from
Publication Simplifiée des Comptes de Campagnes.
17Only 10 percent of the districts assigned a seat in the first round.
18The letters M and F refer to the gender of the candidates; the term 97 loser clearly indicates
a candidate who had been a candidate before but was not an incumbent; the term mover refers to
a candidate who was elected in 1997 but in another district.
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elections. Besides a variable measuring the male advantage, which we describe
next, the vector Xj of controls includes the score in the second-round of the 1997
(resp. 2002) election obtained by the candidate of the same district and same party
as candidate j.19 This party-district-specific variable accounts for the aggregate
preference toward a specific party within each district. It also serves the purpose
of controlling for the fact that women might be sent to “worst” districts than men.
A second control is age diﬀerence between opponents in the same district, since a
candidate’s age is plausibly correlated with his(her) perceived quality or experience
(we deal with other indirect tests of the role of experience below). We also control for
the diﬀerence of the square of their age.20 Finally, we control for party aﬃliations,
since they could be correlated to the gender bias. This is done by including an
indicator variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is from UMP and 0 if he or she
is from PS. A constant term is also included, which represents the average score of
a candidate in 2002 (resp. 2007) when all other regressors were zero.21 Error terms
(εj) follow standard assumptions imposed by the ordinary least squares estimation
method.22
The key regressor is the male advantage. It can be measured by a variable
that takes value 1 if a male has a female opponent, 0 if the two candidates are
of the same gender, and -1 if a female has a male opponent. We will also show,
although it is not crucial to our argument, that the implicit symmetry assumption
— namely that woman vs woman is just like man vs man and that the advantage of
a man incumbent (respectively, new man candidate) over a woman is equivalent to
19Thus we also eliminate some observations that have no such correspondence in 1997, e.g. when
no PS, RPR or UDF candidates ran in that district in 1997 or if they were eliminated in the first
round. (Since the UMP did not exist in 1997 we use the score from the RPR or UDF.)
20Both are divided by 100 to make results easier to present.
21We also considered controlling for the diﬀerence in campaign expenditures between the can-
didates in the same district. Out of the eight specifications reported in Tables 2 and 4, adding
this regressor had no qualitative impact on the male advantage estimates, probably because most
candidates received amounts close to their legal upper bound. Given this, and given that we do not
have this data for 2007, this regressor has not been included.
22The fact that the dependent variable lies between 0 and 1 could be problematic in an OLS
regression if we had regressors with values in a large range. Here it is not a problem because
the right hand side is composed mostly of regressors between 0 and 1. Nonetheless, we have





= βXj + εj . The conclusions are
unchanged (in particular the sign and statistical significance of our measure of male advantage),




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.550*** 0.618*** 0.508*** 0.516***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044)
Male Advantage 0.009* 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.360* 0.350* 0.105 0.144
(0.187) (0.191) (0.169) (0.167)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Party Right of Center 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.033***
(0.010)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 0.036*** -0.007
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved -0.008 -0.026
(0.014) (0.029)
Constant 0.166*** 0.147*** 0.233*** 0.226***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 237 237 282 282
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: 2002 scores: significant male advantage
the disadvantage of a woman incumbent (respectively, new woman candidate) with
respect to a man — is actually supported by the data.
Table 2 reports estimation results for 2002. Specifications (1) and (2) only use
new candidates while specifications (3) and (4) use incumbents.23 Specifications
23 In specifications (1) and (2), since we limit attention to new candidates, and since in each second
round of each district election the race is 91% of the time between a new candidate and someone
who is not a new candidate, only about 4% of the new candidates need to be dropped in order to
avoid having two candidates from the same district (which would determine correlation between
the error terms). However, the results are basically identical with or without such a restriction of
the sample. When more than one new candidate ran in the same district, the selection rule was to
select male candidates if they ran against a woman, otherwise to select the candidate whose first
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(1) and (3) control for the type of the opponent (either a new candidate, a 1997
loser, or a 1997 winner that was moved to a diﬀerent district): for (1) the excluded
category is an incumbent opponent and for (3) it is a new candidate opponent.
These dummies are jointly statistically significant (p-value < 0.1) in specification
(1) but not in specification (3) (p-value > 0.1) and thus we also report (2) and (4)
where those dummies are excluded. Own party score in 1997 and the party position
are statistically significant in every specification. Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of own
party score in 1997 is positive.24 Age diﬀerence has a positive impact on score for
both new candidates and incumbents, but is statistically significant only for new
candidates.
The main finding is a statistically significant male advantage, which is observed
for both new candidates and incumbents irrespective of the specification.25 Table 5
in appendix 2 shows how this eﬀect diﬀers when a woman faces a woman, a woman
faces a man, and a man faces a woman, from the baseline where a man faces a man.
We show that the hypothesis that woman vs. woman is not diﬀerent from man vs.
man and that the advantage of a man vs a woman equals the disadvantage of a
woman against a man cannot be rejected (this is termed the symmetry hypothesis
in the table). In the same table, one can notice from columns 3b and 4b that female
incumbents suﬀered a statistically significant disadvantage.
One question to ask is to what extent the male advantage is a stable phenom-
enon or to what extent it was simply a transient one, perhaps determined by the
sudden influx of less experienced female candidates due to the introduction of parity.
Table 3 presents results for the 1997 and 2007 data. For 1997 we cannot separate
new candidates and incumbents and many regressors are missing. Table 6 presents
regressions that helps us to assess the bias in the estimate of male advantage in the
1997 data due to the confounding of incumbency and male advantage as well as the
impact of the other missing regressors. Specifications 10 and 11 divide the data by
party, and include a dummy regressor for incumbency. This allows us to see that the
name start with the earliest letter in the alphabet.
24One eﬀect of the male bias could be to aﬀect party allegiance as a function of the gender of the
candidates, which would suggest interacting own party score in 1997 with gender. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the eﬀect of score in 1997 is the same for males and females in specification
1 through 4.
25 Interacting “Male Advantage” with “Party Right of Center” indicates that there are either no
diﬀerences in terms of the impact of the male advantage on score across parties (specifications 2
and 3) or that it is more severe for the PS (statistically significant at the 10% level for specifications
1 and 4).
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male advantage is about two thirds of the incumbency advantage. Specification 5b
mimics the 1997 specification using the 2002 data. This gives an estimate of male
advantage about 25% higher than the estimate in 1997 and thus suggest that the
male advantage prior to the 2002 election might have been slightly weaker. Clearly,
the data from 1997 and 2007 do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of a stable
presence of male advantage.
Coming back to the 2002 data, one interesting question is to what extent the male
advantage mattered, looking for the impact of gender on the probability of winning.
Table 4 presents logit estimates of the determinants of a win (win equals one and lose
equals zero) using the same regressors as for the specifications presented in Table 2.
In both specifications (6) and (8) the joint hypothesis that the eﬀect of the type of
opponent (new, 1997 loser, or was moved district) is equal to zero cannot be rejected
(p-value > 0.1). For both new candidates and incumbents, all other regressors have
the expected sign and are statistically significant. For a male, having an opponent of
opposite gender increases the probability of winning — and for a woman it decreases
it. The popularity of a candidate’s party in 1997 has a significant positive eﬀect.
The older the candidate with respect to (her)his opponent, the more likely (s)he is to
win, but this eﬀect is decreasing as the age diﬀerence increases. Finally, everything
else being equal, the UMP candidates were more likely to win in 2002.
To summarize, men have a statistically higher score when they face a female
candidate. A man facing a woman gets between 1 and 2 percentage points boost in
his score compared to a case where he faces a man. Although this advantage may
seem small in magnitude, it had an important impact for the candidates’ probability
of winning in 2002. Using specification (7) we compute the probability of winning
for a new male candidate who runs against a female to be 22 percentage points
higher than against a male (this is computed setting all other regressors at their
sample mean values).26 Similar computations using specification (9) reveal that the
equivalent gain for incumbent males is 10 percentage points.
26To see how the roughly 1 to 2 percentage point diﬀerence can be consistent with the 22 percent
probability diﬀerence, note that more than 10 percent of the run-oﬀs have a victory margin of less





(5) (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
Own Party Score in 2002 0.666*** 0.786*** 0.730*** 0.732***
(0.065) (0.059) (0.069) (0.068)
Male Advantage 0.029*** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.007* 0.007*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age Diﬀerence /100 -0.062** -0.044* 0.206 0.208
(0.025) (0.025) (0.149) (0.148)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 0.000** 0.000* -0.002* -0.003*
0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001)
Party Right of Center -0.032*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.024***
(0.009)
Opponent is a 2002 Loser 0.043*** -0.001
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved 0.003 -0.007
(0.023) (0.035)
Constant 0.515*** 0.171*** 0.123*** 0.177*** 0.175***
(0.006) (0.030) (0.028) (0.038) (0.037)
Observations 346 204 204 229 229
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Male advantage before and after 2002
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Candidate: New Incumbent
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Own Party Score in 1997 14.949*** 16.653*** 24.430*** 24.497***
(3.484) (3.215) (4.117) (4.067)
Male Advantage 0.729** 0.962*** 0.761** 0.856***
(0.320) (0.299) (0.326) (0.318)
Age Diﬀerence /100 17.314 14.504 26.715* 30.371**
(12.985) (12.818) (15.074) (14.942)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.190 -0.156 -0.282* -0.314**
(0.127) (0.125) (0.145) (0.144)
Party Right of Center 3.617*** 3.076*** 5.336*** 5.206***
(0.673) (0.550) (0.899) (0.891)
Opponent is a New Candidate 1.116*
(0.666)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 1.528* -0.623*
(0.836) (0.374)
Opponent was Moved -0.722 -0.240
(0.879) (1.489)
Constant -10.380*** -10.451*** -13.080*** -13.351***
(1.879) (1.731) (2.240) (2.216)
Observations 237 237 282 282
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Male Advantage on probability of winning (Logit)
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2.2 Causes of male advantage: experience, voters’ bias, party bias
In this section we highlight what our data analysis can yield in terms of the likelihood
of the various sources of male advantage that one could intuitively refer to.
As already pointed out in the Introduction, the male advantage we have iden-
tified among incumbents tends to prove that diﬀerential experience cannot be the
only source of the male bias. Moreover, we estimated specifications 1 and 2 on a
subsample of young candidates (more specifically, using the subsample of candidates
who are younger than the youngest incumbent in our sample). The estimates of the
male advantage are still statistically significant (and the coeﬃcient estimate is ac-
tually larger at about 0.028 and 0.023 in each specification), in spite of the fact that
in that subsample the oﬃce holding experience must be minimal for any gender
(although of course there could still be some unobservable systematic diﬀerences at
local or regional levels).
Next, we reject the hypothesis that the male bias in 2002 comes from a party
bias. This hypothesis consists of asserting that the diﬀerence in the score of female
candidates can be due to females being sent by biased party leaders to less favourable
districts. Note first that our regressions control for the score of the party in the
candidate’s district in the previous election, and hence, unless there are important
changes in between elections in terms of which districts are diﬃcult to win, the
regressions themselves are already basically separating the male advantage from the
party and district specific characteristics. A party bias would take the form of a
correlation between gender and the expected score of candidates. In Figure 1, we
divide the range of 1997 scores into intervals of 2.5% and present the ratio of new
men candidates in districts falling in each interval. It turns out that women are
sent to districts where the average 1997 score is equal to 44.7% while men average is
45.5%. Both a t-test (p-value = 0.31) and a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test (p-value
= 0.17) cannot reject that the two are equal.27 In other words, no party has shown
a biased preference for men over women in “good” districts where it did not have
an incumbent.
27 In a previous version of the paper, available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/print/fmm_2006.pdf.,
we consider other ways to determine the presence of party bias. We also explore the possibility of
party strategic behavior given the existence of a male advantage (which would suggest a tendency
for parties to place men in close races and women in uncontested races, but without assigning
disproportionately the good districts to men). We concluded from that analysis that there is little
to no evidence of party bias or of strategic behavior, and in relative terms strategic behavior is
slightly more likely.
17
In contrast with the 2002 elections, in 2007 we find some evidence of party bias:
The 2002 score of the districts where women were sent as candidates in 2007 averaged
45.8%, and for men it is 47.9%. These are statistically diﬀerent using both the t-test






























Figure 1: Percentage of new male 2002 candidates as a function of 1997 score of
own party
Another way parties could treat woman diﬀerently is by giving them less funding
for the campaign. There doesn’t seem to be any evidence of this in 2002. In fact,
one party gave on average more to its female candidates. There is, however, a big
diﬀerence across parties. The UMP gave 10000 Euros to many of its candidate (the
median of what it gave is 10000 Euros) while the PS gave nothing to a majority of
them (its median is 0). The UMP gave on average 9443 Euros to its female and
9423 Euros to its male candidates. The PS gave 1496 Euros and 1730 Euros to its
female and male candidates respectively. Using a t-test, for neither party are these
numbers statistically diﬀerent, while using the Wilcoxon/M-W test it is at the 10%
level for the UMP (in which case women were treated more favorably than man).
Given the conclusion that the experience factor and party bias were not relevant
nor present in 2002, it leaves voters’ bias as the most likely explanation for the male
advantage.
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3 A Model of Constitutional Design Incentives for As-
sembly Incumbents
The Assembly deputies are elected with a two-ballot majority rule. In order to avoid
having to deal with strategic voting, in our model we assume that there are only
two parties, so that the system is equivalent to one-ballot plurality.
Downs [7] defines a political party as “a coalition of men seeking to control
the governing apparatus by legal means,” where by coalition he means “a group
of individuals who have certain ends in common and cooperate with each other
to achieve them.” A simple way to operationalize this definition in a theoretical
framework is to view a party as a “coalition of incumbents seeking re-election.”
Given the importance of incumbent politicians in any party hierarchy, it is clear
that any party leader will have at least two objectives in mind when choosing the
composition of the party candidate list: the maximization of the number of seats the
party will obtain and the maximization of the chances of re-election of the party’s
incumbent politicians.28 For simplicity we will also assume that all incumbents are
men.
The crucial simplifying assumption of the theoretical model is that if a man
candidate runs against a woman he is elected no matter what the voters of that
district think of the candidates’ policy platforms. This very strong form of male
bias is assumed in order to make computations manageable, but the qualitative
results do not change if a weaker form of male bias is considered.
Before turning to the more general model, it is important to illustrate the basic
intuition. Suppose that we just needed to explain why men incumbents can prefer a
“pure” parity law to the status quo without parity. We could give the explanation by
means of a simple example: suppose that the country is divided into two districts,
so that the Assembly is composed of two incumbents, i.e., the previously elected
deputies of those two districts; suppose also that the two incumbents are of the
two major parties and that they must run in the district where they were elected
(either because it would be illegal or because voters would punish such a switch). If
no parity law is passed, the chances of re-election of an incumbent depend on the
28The assumption that parties care about the number of seats obtained by their policy platform
as well as about the probability of re-electing incumbents will be kept in order to make the model
solvable. After proving our formal proposition using this simplified party objective, we will discuss
the implications of extending the model to more complex but perhaps more realistic assumptions
about the internal hierarchy of parties.
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realization of voters’ policy preferences in his district, whereas if a pure parity law
is passed, each incumbent is sure to run against a woman (as the men quota will
be used by the other incumbent running in his own district), and hence there is an
additional advantage, inducing a higher probability of re-election (probability 1 in
the case of the extreme gender bias mentioned above). However, explaining why
they passed a law that allows parties to pay fees to violate parity is not possible by
means of a simple example, and requires a more explicit analysis of all the politicians’
incentives.
Let the two parties be denoted by L and S. There is a set [0, 1] of districts. The
current Assembly is composed by the candidates who were elected in the previous
elections and are still in oﬃce. Districts in [0, λ) have an incumbent of party L,
whereas districts in [λ, 1] have an incumbent of party S. We assume without loss of
generality that λ ≥ 0.5 (party L is the large party).
At time 0, the deputies vote for a value of c ∈ [0,∞] , the fee a party needs to pay
to circumvent parity in a district. If c = 0, there is no limit to the number of men
running in the country for the same party, that is, there is no parity requirement
(the status quo). If c = ∞, it is illegal to have more than fifty percent of men
running, the pure parity case. If 0 < c < ∞, the law allows parties to send men
to any extra measure of districts beyond fifty percent provided the party pays fees
equal to c times that extra measure. We need to prove that the vote outcome can be
a positive and finite c, such that fees are paid in equilibrium under some realization
of policy preferences.
At time 1, lists are composed. That is, each party decides whom to run in each
district. Incumbents are assumed to re-run in their district if their party decides
to run a man in that district. Also, we assume that incumbents cannot shift from
their home district to another one. Consequently, if a man runs in a district where
the party did not win the previous election, then this man is a new candidate.29
At time 2, voting takes place. In each district, voters vote for the candidate they
prefer. There are only two candidates in each district, hence no strategic voting
takes place.
Voters diﬀer in their platform preferences, which can change over time, but they
29The implicit assumption is that incumbency is local, and does not constitute an advantage if
one switches district. The little evidence of incumbents running in diﬀerent districts from the one
where they had been elected confirms that this assumption is realistic, but the qualitative results of
our model hold even when we allow incumbents to do this kind of shift, but with useless additional
computation complexity.
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also have very strong gender preferences: Being in favor of the platform of one
party translates in a vote for that party unless that party’s candidate is a woman
running against a man. In the time elapsing between time 0 and time 2, voters’
platform preferences may change. At time 2, districts [0, z) prefer the platform
of party L, and [z, 1] are in favor of the platform of S. The implicit assumption
here is that in any possible new realization of voters’ platform preferences it cannot
happen that district i has a majority of S platform supporters and a district i0 > i
has a majority of L supporters. This order assumption allows us to simplify the
treatment of uncertainty at time 0, since in this way the uncertainty is just about
the parameter z. The uncertainty about z is greater at time 0 than at time 1.
For simplicity, we assume that it is known at time 1, whereas only the probability
distribution is known at time 0.30
The utility of an incumbent of party p, p ∈ {L, S}, depends on the fraction of
seats obtained by his party in the time 2 election, denoted by Np; on whether or not
he is re-elected; and on the budget of the party, which is aﬀected by the total cost
paid by the party to circumvent parity, denoted by Cp. Formally, for all i ∈ [0, λ)




where a is the utility of being re-elected, Ii is the indicator taking value 1 if i is
re-elected and 0 otherwise, and U(N) denotes the utility that i derives from the fact
that his party obtains a fraction N of the seats. Even though the result could be
proved with any U(N) weakly convex for all N ∈ [0, 0.5) and weakly concave for all
N ∈ (0.5, 1], the following functional form is the simplest to consider (letting b be a
real number in [0, 1)):
U(N) = bN if N < 0.5
0.5 if N = 0.5
1 + bN if N > 0.5.
For all i ∈ [λ, 1]
Ui = U(NS) + aIi −
CS
1− λ. (2)
Consistent with the Downsian view of a party discussed at the beginning of this
section, we define a party as the aggregation of its incumbents. Consequently, we
30No result depends on the simplifying assumption that z is known at time 1. Everything would
go through in a similar manner if at time 1 there were a less precise update.
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assume that the utility of a party is the sum of the utilities of its incumbents:
UL = λU(NL) + aIL −CL, (3)
and
US = (1− λ)U(NS) + aIS − CS (4)
where Ip stands for the number of re-elected incumbents of party p, p ∈ {L, S}.
Parity means that there needs to be fifty percent of candidates of each gender
for each party. Any deviation from that gender distribution entails a marginal cost
of c, so that
Cp = c |Mp − 0.5| , p ∈ {L, S}
where Mp is the fraction of men candidates of party p selected at time 1.
Given all the assumptions above, we have our main theoretical finding:
Proposition 1: If b is small and a is large (i.e., re-electing an incumbent
is important for a party but the marginal utility of a new seat is small unless it
allows the party to obtain the majority), then there exist well behaved probability
distributions of voters’ platform preferences such that, at the constitutional choice
stage (at time 0), a “parity with fees” system is unanimously preferred to the no
parity system, and is preferred by a majority to the pure parity system.
The formal proof is in appendix 1. The intuition is similar to the one given for
the two-district case as far as the reason for preferring pure parity to the status
quo. The intuition for the additional result that parity with fees can dominate even
pure parity is as follows: given that a party is a coalition of incumbents and hence
re-electing incumbents has priority over electing new candidates, the larger party
wants a parity law in order to protect its incumbents in the states of the world in
which platform preferences happen to favor party S, but given that L’s incumbents
are more than fifty percent, pure parity is dominated by a system where even the
other λ− 0.5 incumbents can be protected (with some probability) by paying fees.
A small b and a relatively large a are needed so that there exist values of c for which
parties are ready to pay the fee only if it allows an incumbent to run: indeed, if
no such value of c exists, parity with fees cannot be optimal as either the party
would refuse to pay to allow one more incumbent to run, or, if the party pays, the
opponent party also pays and the incumbent runs against a man, thereby loosing his
seat anyway. There are restrictions on the class of admissible distribution functions
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because the uncertainty to be re-elected needs to be suﬃciently large: if a large
fraction of incumbents are sure to be re-elected, they may have no incentive to pass
the law as it doesn’t increase the probability that their party wins the election and it
is likely to impose a cut in the budget of the party. However, as one can verify in the
appendix, the conditions on a, b and on the skewness of the probability distribution
to obtain consensus on parity with fees are very reasonable.
As a corollary of proposition 1, one could easily check from its formal proof
that the expected number of women elected given parity law (with fees allowed)
is zero. The result is thus very sharp: not only is the parity law as it passed in
France perfectly consistent with the self interest of the male incumbents, as proved
by proposition 1, but it is also completely ineﬀective in terms of the oﬃcial goals. Of
course, using a less extreme type of gender bias than that of this simple model, we
could determine a positive (but small) number of expected women elected. In fact,
the model could be easily extended relaxing the assumption that a male candidate
always wins against a female candidate. We could assume instead that, when voters
prefer the political platform of his opponent’s party, a male candidate’s probability
of winning is some interior g > 1/2 if the opponent is a woman. Leaving probability
1 of victory in the easier case in which platform preferences are also in his favor,
the only change would then be that the expected utility for the party at time 1 of
having one additional incumbent running in a district where the voters’ preferences
have switched decreases. Consequently, the optimal parity with fees system would
become one associated with a lower c. The equilibrium number of women elected
would be strictly positive (but small) in this simple extension.
Another (more interesting) extension could be to assume that parties are “more”
than a simple coalition of incumbents. There may well be other potential candidates,
besides the incumbents, whose election would increase the party utility by b + a,
and who come from districts where the other party has an incumbent. Such an
extension is particularly relevant for France, as many right wing deputies elected in
1995 lost their seats in 1997 due to the huge (unexpected) victory of the socialist
party, and ran again in 2002.31 Given the marginal utility for a party to have those
candidates running, the equilibrium number of fees paid by the parties increases for
most values of z, with the possible outcome that both parties pay fees simultaneously,
in accordance with what has been observed. This would not aﬀect, however, our
main result. Indeed, even if the probability of having to run against a man increases
31 In 129 districts out of the 361 we analyse, there was a candidate who had lost in 1997.
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(as the opponent party is more likely to pay the fee and have a male candidate), it is
still optimal to have a parity with fees system as it both guarantees that incumbents
are still allowed to run, and it increases their probability of running against a woman,
in the case where no opponent party member looks for election in that district.
An important corollary of our proposition is that parity may aﬀect the party
composition of the Assembly (and hence policies) when voters’ platform preferences
change with respect to the status quo. The number of seats won by the large party
that is losing support in terms of platform preferences is (weakly) larger than if
parity was not applied. Thus, the introduction of parity reduces the variance of
party composition.
4 The ex ante and ex post incentives of Senators
In the previous sections we have first proved empirically the existence of male bias in
the electorate, and then we have shown how the ex ante incentives of Deputies and
the ex post results were both consistent with a simple rational choice explanation
based on male bias itself. In this section we aim to show the corresponding incentives
of Senators, although no formal model nor empirical tests are necessary for this
chamber.
A senator’s term is six years, and a fraction of the Senate is recomposed every
three years. The country is divided into a few large districts, and, depending on the
population of the district, a number of senators, ranging from 1 to 12, are elected
in each district. If the number of seats to be allocated is equal to or below a
threshold, then a two-round plurality system is in order and parity does not apply.
If the number is above the threshold, then the system is CPR. In this case, parity
means that in a party list there cannot be two consecutive candidates of the same
gender. The threshold was equal to two in 2001 and to three in 2004.
An essential feature of the senatorial elections is that the set of voters is composed
of grands electeurs only, and about 95% of them are municipality deputies. They
had no say in the passing of the parity law, but they tried to influence it through
their senators. Municipal elections are two round list elections. A list can run in the
second round if it obtains 10% or more in the first round. The seat allocation rule is
proportional with a 50% seat bonus to the winner. For instance, if a party wins the
second round elections with 40% of the votes and 60 seats are to be allocated, then
it will get 30+(0.40*30)=42 seats and the remaining 18 seats are allocated among
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the other parties proportionally to their second round score. The implementation of
the Parity law at the municipal level has this property: out of each set of subsequent
six candidates in a party list, three have to be women. The only freedom which
is left to the parties is the position of the women within each set of six candidates.
Given the electoral rule and the amounts of seats allocated in each municipality
(varying between 29 and 67), the Parity Law is bound to have a huge eﬀect on the
gender composition of the municipal assemblies, and a lot of incumbents must lose
their seat. A fraction of them must be thrown out of the list.32 Under the pressure
of their grands electeurs, Senators obtained the amendment that parity would not
apply in municipalities with less than 3500 inhabitants, whereas Assembly deputies
first proposed it to apply to all municipalities with more than 2000 inhabitants.
Senators also proposed to remove the three women out of six candidate rule, but it
was maintained. The percentage of women elected in the municipalities with more
than 3500 inhabitants went up from 25.7% to 47.5% (thereby making the fraction
of women elected in municipal councils rise from 21.7% to 33%).
Protecting their electorate was not the only concern of the senators: They also
had to protect their own seats.33 Out of the 74 (resp., 72) incumbent senators
looking for re-election in 2001 (resp., 2004) in districts where CPR applies, only
5 (resp., 8) were women. Before the law was passed, senators tried to obtain the
amendment that no alternating gender rule apply for the senatorial elections, but
failed.34 Nevertheless, only 20 seats - 28% - (resp., 26 - 32.9% -) went to female
candidates. Given the number of districts where parity does not apply and the low
eﬀectiveness where it applies, the percentage of women is 16.6%.
What did senators resort to, in order to circumvent the law? The answer is what
32The intuitive reason for the eﬀectiveness of parity with a two-round PR system with majority
bonus is that with this system most municipalities ended up with one party holding a large majority
of the seats, and if —say — the elected members of such a party are 30, the law described in the text
makes sure that 15 of them are women.
33The simple computations contained in this section use the electoral outcomes presented on the
website of the French senate, http://www.senat.fr/. The details of the computation are available
upon request.
34Senators have a weaker role in France relative to many other countries. “The Senate’s legislative
powers are limited; the National Assembly has the last word in the event of a disagreement between
the two houses.” (US Department of State (2004)) This is clearly visible in Title V Article 45 of the
Constitution “If the joint committee does not succeed in adopting a common text, or if the text is
not adopted as provided in the preceding paragraph, the Government may, after a further reading
by the National Assembly and by the Senate, ask the National Assembly to make a final decision.”
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we call party proliferation.35 Out of the 29 districts where proportional elections
were held in 2001 or 2004, party proliferation (incumbents previously elected under
the same flag now running under diﬀerent ones) took place in 11 of them. In 8
other cases candidates elected on diﬀerent lists registered as members of the same
senatorial group after the election.36 Finally, in several other districts, candidates
previously active in the same party, though new in the senatorial race, ran on
diﬀerent lists, with two examples of such lists obtaining more than 10 percent.
Party proliferation has clearly been a wide phenomenon in both elections, which
explains the low eﬀectiveness of parity.37
Let us now analyze more closely the phenomenon of strategic party proliferation
in CPR. We first describe the conditions under which party proliferation is most
likely to happen. Then we study its eﬀect on the party composition of the Assembly.
4.1 Party proliferation
The cost of creating a party is relatively low for the senators. Given the grands
electeurs system and the size of the districts, the actual number of votes needed to
obtain a seat varies between 260 and 892. Moreover, those are councillors themselves
and senators have regular opportunities to meet them. Let us consider a party
likely to obtain a score of s and an associated number of k seats, with k male
incumbents. Let k be an even number. It seems reasonable to assume that the
incumbent’s advantage is decreasing among candidates from the leader of the list to
the kth elected: popularity decreases with rank. Given parity, only k2 incumbents
can be given positions among the first k positions, those leading to a seat with




th incumbent is pivotal in the proliferation
process. His only chance of being elected is in creating his own list and diverting
at least sk+1 voters from the main party. This score is necessary, as the score of the
35This is illustrated by the Meurthe-et-Moselle district, where 4 seats had to be allocated. Two
right-wing incumbents had been elected under the same party flag before. They split the list,
created two new parties, ran on the top of their respective list (followed, as required by the law, by
a woman) and got re-elected.
36Even though by definition those examples involve new candidates to the senatorial elec-
tions, these candidates do typically have incumbent-type advantages, as they are former ministers,
deputies, region presidents, etc.
37Proliferation of party lists has probably been made easier by the fact that senators have a
unique type of (small) electorate, the grands electeurs. However, Jones [11] (table 2) shows, among
other things, that some kind of list proliferation also took place in Costa Rica after the introduction
of gender quotas (excluding the main two parties).
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main party, down to ksk+1 , is otherwise still superior to k times that of the dissident
list. This may not be suﬃcient, however, since other parties may have a larger
d’Hondt score for the last seat and obtain the formerly kth seat of that party. To
illustrate this fact, let us consider a district where three parties compete for 8 seats
and the distribution of scores is (45,27.5,27.5), so that the allocation of seats is
(4,2,2). After the parity reform, incumbent 3 of the first party is ejected from the
first positions on the list. By running on his own and obtaining 10 percent of the
votes, which corresponds to scores (35,10,27.5,27.5), he would keep his seat. If we
compare that result with the situation where there is only one opponent party and
the scores are (45,55) before parity and (35,10,55) after proliferation by incumbent
3, we now have a distribution of seats going from (4,4) to (3,0,5). The lower bound
in the second situation is now 11 and the scores (33.9,11.1,55) then lead to (3,1,4).
Let us also note that any two incumbents ejected from the main party list have no
incentive to create a joint list, as, given parity, their joint list would have to win
three seats for them both to be elected.




th incumbent is sure to keep his seat if he creates
his own list. Then the probability that the k2 th incumbent be elected on the main
list decreases, as the new score of the main party may no longer be suﬃcient to




th incumbent is able to be elected
by running on his own, then so is the k2 th incumbent, given the assumption that
individual popularity decreases with the rank. The prudent strategy by candidate
k





th incumbent to be elected.
From this simple argument we can infer that proliferation is the more likely




th incumbent, but the unravelling may determine a
situation in which the incumbents who actually are observed making the split are
higher in the rank. If k is large, it may be impossible to have a suﬃciently large
popularity for the (k/2+1)-th incumbent and, at the same time, a decreasing order
of popularity. This leads to the following:
Remark: Party proliferation is more likely when (1) the incumbency advantage
is more equal among candidates and (2) the number of incumbents on the list,
and/or the number of seats expected by a list, is lower.
The example and the reasoning above all assume that the scores are perfectly
expected. Proliferation is also more likely when the uncertainty of being elected
by running on one’s own is lower. When the number of seats to be allocated in a
27
district and the number of relevant parties are larger, then the competition for the
last seats to allocate is larger, which increases the uncertainty.
This explains why, given that districts have on average a relatively small number
of seats, parity had low eﬀect in the senatorial elections.
4.2 Assembly composition eﬀect
Parity may also aﬀect the Assembly composition under CPR. There are two diﬀerent
eﬀects. One is the large party eﬀect, which plays in a similar way as under SMD:
if a party has more incumbents than half the total number of seats, then it has to
lose the votes associated with the incumbency advantage of the incumbents it ejects
from the list. Clearly, this may aﬀect the score of the party, and, therefore, the
number of seats it expects.
The second eﬀect is directly associated to party proliferation. In the example
above, proliferation by incumbent 3 led to a change in the Assembly composition
from (4,4) to (3,0,5) which means a shift of one seat from left to right. The example
may look extreme, as the proliferation was a failure. However, other examples may
be given of successful proliferation aﬀecting the Assembly composition. Consider
a district where two parties compete for 6 seats. The expected scores are (43,57),
which would lead to a (3,3) allocation of seats. Assume that, indeed, there are
three incumbents out of each platform. Again, we may think that incumbent 3 of
the left party can profitably create his own list, thereby preventing incumbent 2
from keeping his own seat. The equilibrium list composition is therefore one where
the left party has split into two lists, led by incumbents 1 and 2 respectively. Let
us assume that the resulting distribution of votes is (24,19,57), the resulting seat
allocation is (1,1,4): proliferation by left incumbent 2 is successful, but increases the
number of seats obtained by the right party.
The composition eﬀect arising from the conflicting interests of an incumbent
seeking to keep his seat and a party seeking to maximize the number of seats obtained
by candidates sharing its platform is likely to aﬀect both large and small parties. It
is well known that under the d’Hondt system a party can never gain by splitting, as
the d’Hondt coeﬃcients cannot rise as a result of a split. On the other hand, as it is
clear from the example, proliferation is more likely to result in a loss of seats when
the d’Hondt coeﬃcient of the party as a whole is the lowest among all parties.
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4.3 Other implications
The above characterization of party proliferation has some implications for the ad-
vocates of gender quota legislations. Given that the probability of success after the
creation of a new list is obviously lower when there is a minimum threshold neces-
sary to obtain seats, one can conjecture that a system with PR, large districts and a
minimum threshold is the most desirable for the representation purposes, although
in a closed list system the details of the law in terms of placement rules are crucial.
Another way to create barriers to party proliferation is by enlarging the districts
and, correspondingly, the number of seats to allocate in the districts. First, this
reduces the expected incumbent’s advantage of the pivotal incumbent. Second, as
the number of competing parties is larger in larger districts, the competition for the
last seats to allocate is larger, thereby increasing the sensitivity of the total number
of seats obtained by a platform to the way the total number of votes is divided
between the lists obtained by proliferation from one party.
5 Concluding Remarks
The common criterion used to evaluate representation reforms is the eﬀectiveness of
the reform. In the literature on descriptive representation the objective to increase
the number of women in politics finds many justifications.38 Among the countries
where voluntary or mandatory gender quotas have been attempted, it is clear that
the highest eﬀectiveness has been achieved in countries using PR with large districts
(see e.g. Jones [11], table 1). It is, therefore, tempting to advocate for changes in the
electoral systems towards more proportionality, larger districts, and closed lists.39
Our paper moderates this conclusion.
The incumbents were interested in not losing their positions, and deputies knew
they were the least challenged by the reform. Had they passed a pure parity system
without allowing for per violation fees, and had there been a demand among voters
for new female candidates, then of course the law would have been eﬀective. On the
other hand, had the reform been more likely to be eﬀective, then deputies would
have shown the same opposition to the law as senators have.
38On the problem of under representation of women in Parliaments and Cabinets see Siaroﬀ [20]
and Rosenthal [19].
39We focus here on women representation, whereas a reform of he electoral system clearly in-
volves multiple considerations. See, for instance, Morelli [16] for a suggestive welfare comparison
of electoral systems.
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Our analysis thus highlights the following trade-oﬀ: when voters are not ready
to favour parties promoting female candidates, reforms are more likely to be passed
in contexts where they won’t be eﬀective.40
A final set of remarks can be made on the comparison between France and other
countries that use single member district elections for their members of Parliament.
A natural question is why has parity law come up in France and not in other countries
with similar electoral systems for their deputies. Our conjecture is that this may
have to do with the perceived gender preferences of the electorate. In the US states
there seems to be no evidence of voters’ hostility against women, nor much evidence
in favor of the male conspiracy theory. Thus, there is no “demand side” clear
explanation for the low number of women in politics (see e.g. Darcy et al. [6] and
Welch et al. [21]). Implicitly this implies a mostly “supply side” story for the U.S.
The sharp contrast between our study on the French case and the earlier studies
on the U.S.41 suggests an intriguing hypothesis to be tested in future research:
Countries where voters’ gender bias exists have fewer women than men because of a
“demand” bias, and are more likely to endogenously generate aﬃrmative action laws;
on the other hand, countries like the U.S. where no voters’ demand bias exists, and
where therefore the shortage of women in politics is a “supply” issue, are unlikely
to have the necessary conditions for the approval of a parity law.
References
[1] Caul, M. (1999): “Women’s representation in parliament: the role of political
parties," Party Politics Vol. 5, 79-98.
[2] Caul, M. (2001): “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender
Quotas: a Cross-National Analysis,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 63(4), 1214-1229.
[3] Commission Nationale des Comptes de Campagne et des Financements Poli-
tiques (2003), “Publication Simplifiée des Comptes de Campagne, ” Journal
40SMD is not the only system where parity is unlikely to be eﬀective: in an open list electoral
system, the strong and well established incumbents have no worries because the order in the lists
does not matter (see the case of Belgium).
41Note that our empirical analysis is based on field data, whereas the studies just mentioned on
the U.S. are based on survey data, and we have no way to say to what extent these sharp diﬀerences
could be due to this.
30
Oﬃciel de la République Francaise Edition des Documents Administratifs, Jour-
naux Oﬃciels.
[4] Converse, P. E. and R. Pierce (1986), Political Representation in France, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, Belknap Press.
[5] Darcy R. and S. Schramm (1977), “When Women Run Against Men,” Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 41(1), 1-12.
[6] Darcy R., S. Welch, and J. Clark (1994), Women, Elections, and Representa-
tion, University of Nebraska Press, 2nd edition.
[7] Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper.
[8] Duflo, E. and R. Chattopadhyay (2004), “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence
from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India,” Econometrica, 72(5), 1409-43.
[9] Duverger M. (1955), The Political Role of Women, Paris: UNESCO.
[10] Hunter A. A., and M. A. Denton (1984), “Do female candidates lose votes?
The experience of female candidates in the 1979 and 1980 Canadian general
elections," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 21, 395-406.
[11] Jones, M.P. (2004): “Quota Legislation and the Election of Women: Learning
from the Costa Rican Experience,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 66(4), 1203-23.
[12] Jourdain, S. (2002), “Parité bien votée commence par les autres,” Libération,
July 13.
[13] Kelley J., and I. McAllister (1984), “Ballot paper cues and the vote in Australia
and Britain: alphabetic voting, sex and title," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.
48, 452-66.
[14] Lovenduski J., and P. Norris (1993), Gender and Party Politics, London: Sage.
[15] Matland, R.E. And D.T. Studlar (1996): “The Contagion of Women Candidates
in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems:
Canada and Norway,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 58(3), 707-733.
[16] Morelli, M. (2004), “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Diﬀerent
Electoral Systems,” Review of Economic Studies, 71(3), 829-53.
31
[17] Murray, E. G. (2004), “Why didn’t parity work? A closer examination of the
2002 election results, French Politics 2(3): 347-362
[18] Rasmussen J. (1983), “Women’s role in contemporary British politics: impedi-
ments to parliamentary candidature," Parliamentary Aﬀairs, Vol. 36, 300-15.
[19] Rosenthal, C.S. (1995): “The Role of Gender in Descriptive Representation,”
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 48, 599-611
[20] Siaroﬀ, A. (2000): “Women’s Representation in the Legislatures and Cabinets
in Industrial Democracies,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 21(2),
197-215.
[21] Welch, S., M.M. Ambrosius, J. Clark and R. Darcy (1985), “The Eﬀect of
Candidate Gender on Election Outcomes in State Legislative Races,” Western
Political Quarterly, Vol. 38(3), 464-475.
[22] Zimmerman, M.-J. “Pourquoi la parité en politique reste-t-elle un enjeu pour
la démocratie française?” Paris: Services du Premier Ministre - Observatoire
de la parité entre les femmes et les hommes, March 2003.
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
Once z is known, the country is conceptually divided into three regions: [0,min{z, λ}) ;
[min{z, λ},max{z, λ}]; and [max{z, λ}, 1] . Parties L and S play a list composi-
tion game, and a strategy is an assignment of a man or a woman in each dis-
trict. Formally, a strategy is an element of {0, 1}[0,1] where 0 (resp. 1) means
that a woman (respectively, a man) is sent to that district. Denote by mjp ∈ [0, 1]
the fraction of men candidates running for party p, p ∈ {L,S}, in region j, j ∈
{[0,min{z, λ}), [min{z, λ},max{z, λ}), [max{z, λ}, 1]}.
Given our assumptions on voters’ platform preferences and gender preferences,
each party wants to send men where the other party sends men if the platform
preference of the voters is favorable, or send men where the opponent sends women
if the opposite is true. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In any Nash equilibrium of the list composition game played at time 1
by the two parties, each party uses the same mixed strategy in every district of the
same region, and hence an equilibrium strategy of party p can be summarized by the
triplet (mjp).
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Proof. Suppose instead that party S puts a man running in district i with
probability mS(i) < mS(i0), where i and i0 are in the same region j.
Then if j is a region in which L wins the man-man races the best response is to
have mL(i0) > mL(i); but this could not be compatible in equilibrium with the
hypothesis, since the best response to the latter inequality for party S must have
the feature mS(i) > mS(i0).
A similar contradiction arises if j is a region in which S wins the man-to-man races:
In this case the best response by L would have to satisfy mL(i) > mL(i0), but this
in turn cannot be compatible in equilibrium with the hypothesis, since the best
response to the latter inequality by party S would be mS(i) > mS(i0). QED.
The list composition game is, therefore, equivalent to a game where parties
have to decide on proportions of men in each of the three regions. Suppose for
example that z < λ (the voters’ support of the L platform has decreased since the







of L candidates are elected in region [0, z) , as all





those who end up running against a woman also win the election, and the probability





Having explained the strategies for any probability distribution over z, let us
now choose a specific probability distribution that will allow us to prove the result.
Assume that z can take values in {0, 1− λ, λ, 1}, with corresponding probabilities
equal to 0.5−f, f, f, 0.5−f , for some f ∈ (0.25, 0.5). (Thus f measures the skewness
of the distribution.)
Assume that b is infinitesimally small, so that it justifies a seat maximizing
behavior ceteris paribus but it can be ignored in the computations. Given this




Uidi = λ+ aIL − CL if NL > 0.5
0.5λ+ aIL − CL if NL = 0.5





Uidi = (1− λ) + aIS − CS if NS > 0.5
0.5(1− λ) + aIS − CS if NS = 0.5
aIS −CS if NS < 0.5.
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Consider first the status quo (c = 0). At time 1, it is a dominant strategy for
both parties to have only male candidates. the expected utility is then:
∀i ∈ [0, 1− λ) : Uei = af + (1 + a)f + (0.5− f)(1 + a)
= (0.5 + f)a+ 0.5;
∀i ∈ [1− λ, λ) : Uei = (1 + a)f + (0.5− f)(1 + a)
= 0.5(1 + a);
∀i ∈ [λ, 1] : Uei = (0.5 + f)a+ 0.5.
Consider next the pure parity case (c = ∞). We first analyse the equilibrium
of the list composition subgames in the four possible cases, and then we deduce the
expected utility of each incumbent.
Case 1: z = 0; the 0.5 men candidates sent by S will be elected, and necessarily
at least some women will be elected too, so that S will win the election. It is optimal
for S to have all its incumbents running. Therefore, in region [0, λ] ,, by lemma 1,






λ in every district of that
region. Consequently, each L incumbent has a probability 0.5λ of running, and, if he
runs, a probability 0.5λ of being elected. All S incumbents are sure to be re-elected.
Case 2: z = 1 − λ. Sending all its 0.5 men to districts in [1− λ, 1] guar-
antees 0.5 seats, and S is sure to have more than that, so, again, S is sure to













S = 1. Incumbents in [0, z) and [λ, 1] are sure to be re-elected,
whereas incumbents in [z, λ) run with probability 12 and, if they run, are elected
with probability 12 .
Cases 3 and 4: z = λ or z = 1. L wins the election. In this case party L
tries to send men where S sends men, and S tries to send men where L sends











Incumbents from region [0, λ) run with probability 0.5λ and are sure to be re-elected
if they run.
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The expected utilities computed at time 0 are as follows.
∀i ∈ [0, 1− λ) : Uei = (0.5− f)
0.52
λ2











(λ+ 0.5− f) + f
¶
a+ 0.5;
∀i ∈ [1− λ, λ) : Uei = (0.5− f)
0.52
λ2


















∀i ∈ [λ, 1] : Uei = 0.5 (1 + a) + 0.5a
= a+ 0.5.
It is easy to see that S incumbents strictly prefer pure parity to no parity, as it
guarantees their re-election.
Let us now consider the case of parity with fees (c = c∗ ∈ (0,∞)). Take in
particular any value of c∗ such that
Assumption a: a/2 > c∗ > b ≈ 0.
Case 1: z = 0. At equilibrium, S must win the election. Indeed, it has at
least 0.5 seats (all its men are elected), and, if it is not suﬃcient to win, then it is
worth paying the fee for one male candidate. So we can consider that S wins the
election with 0.5 men running. S tries to maximize the number of seats obtained,
so that the equilibrium will be mixed, with MS (the number of men running for
Sin [0, λ)) equal to λ− 0.5. The utility of party L is UL = a0.5λ ML − c∗ (ML − 0.5)






ML+0.5c∗, so that L pays the fees for all its incumbents whenever
0.5
λ a− c∗ > 0, that is, a > 2c∗λ, which holds given assumption a. Therefore, all the




λ , whereas the utility of each S incumbent is 1 + a.
Case 2: z = 1− λ. As above, S is sure to win, provided it runs all incumbents
from λ to 1 and the remaining men (λ− 0.5) randomly in the interval [z, λ]. It has
no incentive to take a man from [λ, 1] to [z, λ), given that c∗ > b, nor to [0, z), as
the probability for a man to be elected in that region is 0. If a man from party
L runs in [z, λ], then his probability of being elected is 0.5. Utility of party L is
UL = (1 − λ)a + 0.5 (ML − (λ− 0.5)) a − c∗(ML − 0.5). So party L will pay the
fees, given assumption a. For each incumbent in [0, 1 − λ), Ui = a − c
∗
λ (λ− 0.5) ,
and the average utility of those from [1− λ, λ) is 0.5a− c∗λ (λ− 0.5) . The utility of
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incumbents of S is 1 + a.
Case 3: z = λ. For a similar reason as above, L is sure to win. Party S sends
all its incumbents, and sends men uniformly in [0, λ). We have UL = 1 + aML −
c∗(ML− 0.5), so that ML = λ, all to be re-elected. The utility of each L incumbent
is 1 + a− c∗λ (λ− 0.5) , and that of S incumbents is a.
Case 4: z = 1. The fact that L men are sure to be elected even if they run
in [λ, 1] does not change the strategy from the previous case, as paying the fee for
having one more male candidate elected is not profitable if he is not an incumbent.
The equilibrium utilities are, therefore, identical to what they are in case 3.















+ f + 0.5
¶
a+ 0.5− C∗;











+ 0.5f + 0.5
¶
a+ 0.5−C∗;
∀i ∈ [λ, 1] : Uei = 0.5 (1 + a) + 0.5a
= a+ 0.5.
At time 0:
Let us now compare the expected utility of each incumbent across the diﬀerent
possible values of c.
1) For incumbents in [0, 1 − λ) : it is clear that parity with fees is the system
which maximizes their probability of being re-elected. But the other consequence
is that fees have to be paid. We have that parity with fees is better than no parity
iﬀ a ≥ 2c∗ λ−0.50.5−f , which can only be satisfied if 0.5− f is not too small. Let us note
that a very low 0.5−f means that those incumbents are almost sure to be re-elected
even without parity, so that it is intuitive that no parity is the best system for them.
Given our assumptions, it is suﬃcient to have 0.5−f > λ−0.5, which is reasonable,
in order to have the incumbents in this region strictly prefer parity with fees to no
parity. Strict parity is better than no parity iﬀ 0.5− f > 2λ (λ− 0.5) , which again
means that the probability to be in a bad state is suﬃciently large; but observe
that the threshold is more diﬃcult to satisfy than in the previous case (it is more
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likely to have parity with fees better than no parity than strict parity better than no
parity). Parity with fees is better than pure parity iﬀ a ≥ 2λc
∗(λ−0.5)
λ(λ−f)−0.5(0.5−f) , which
is satisfied if the condition above for parity with fees to dominate no parity holds.
Thus, parity with fees is the best for those incumbents if 0.5−f is suﬃciently large.
2) For incumbents in [1−λ, λ) : parity with fees is preferred to no parity iﬀ a >
2c∗ λ−0.50.5−(1−λ)f . But we have already assumed that a > 2c
∗, and the fraction is always
lower than 1. Parity with fees is preferred to strict parity iﬀ a > 2c∗ λ(λ−0.5)
(1−λ)f+λ2+0.52 ,
and again the fraction is always smaller than 1. Consequently, parity with fees is
always the strictly most preferred solution in this region.
3) The incumbents in [λ, 1] all strictly prefer a parity law, with whatever c > 0,
to the status quo.
Consequently, given assumption a, there are many probability distributions with
many possible skewness levels such that parity with fees is strictly preferred by the
majority (the L incumbents) to any other system. Given the strict preference by
the S incumbents for any type of parity law over the status quo, the parity with





(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.548*** 0.620*** 0.501*** 0.508***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044)
Male candidate with Female Opponent 0.011 0.023** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Female candidate with Male Opponent -0.009 -0.013* -0.015* -0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Female candidate with Female Opponent -0.010 -0.003 0.013 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.373** 0.359* 0.113 0.149
(0.187) (0.192) (0.169) (0.167)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Party Right of Center 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.034***
(0.011)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 0.037*** -0.007
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved -0.009 -0.026
(0.014) (0.029)
Constant 0.168*** 0.145*** 0.236*** 0.230***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 237 237 282 282
F-Test of Symmetry Hypothesis (p-values) 0.610 0.708 0.496 0.425
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: The Eﬀect of Male Bias on Scores
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Candidate: PS UMP Pooled
(10)a (11)a (5b)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.650*** 0.541***
(0.044) (0.053)
Indumbent Advantage 0.022*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.010)
Male Advantage 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.386** 0.040
(0.169) (0.210)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Party Right of Center 0.051***
(0.007)
Constant 0.134*** 0.259*** 0.457***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.005)
Observations 207 207 349
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Only includes incumbents and new candidates.
Table 6: The Incumbency Advantage in 2002
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